Re-Examining the Traditional Legal Test of Literary Similarity A Proposal for Content Analysis by Sorensen, Robert C. & Sorensen, Theodore C.
Cornell Law Review
Volume 37
Issue 4 Summer 1952 Article 2
Re-Examining the Traditional Legal Test of Literary
Similarity A Proposal for Content Analysis
Robert C. Sorensen
Theodore C. Sorensen
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please
contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Robert C. Sorensen and Theodore C. Sorensen, Re-Examining the Traditional Legal Test of Literary Similarity A Proposal for Content
Analysis , 37 Cornell L. Rev. 638 (1952)
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol37/iss4/2
RE-EXAMINING THE TRADITIONAL LEGAL TEST OF
LITERARY SIMILARITY: A PROPOSAL FOR
CONTENT ANALYSIS
Robert C. Sorensen*
Theodore C. Sorensen*
If the object of copyright laws is to secure to authors for a limited
time the exclusive use and benefits of their creative works and thus
provide them with incentive to further effort, the protection against in-
fringement to-the-point-of-similarity must be carefully enforced.'
Seldom can direct proof of copying be introduced. Consequently
the author who claims infringement must undertake the proof of four
fundamental elements: (1) the existence of his copyright; (2) the
fact that his work was copyrightable, being original and not in the public
domain; (3) the fact that the alleged infringer had access to the copy-
righted work; and (4) finally, evidence of similarity sufficient to indicate
an infringement of the copyright without further proof of intent.
The problems of proof involved in the first three elements, except in
those cases of disputed originality, offer little challenge to the court in
that they depend upon events (often stipulated) the existence of which
can be clearly tested by resort to specific law and fact. But proof of
similarity requires evidence the validity of which to date is extremely
illusive and subject to as many disputed testimonials as the contestants
may care to muster. Thus, it is with proof of similarity in an area of
constant disputation that copyright attorneys are constantly concerned.
The history of the concept of copyright tells the story of changing
functions of the state, technological progress in mechanical fields of
communication, and new social'ethics. The advantages which may accrue
to a writer from today's mass distribution of literary output inspire a
somewhat different outlook than was held during the early middle ages
when much of the world's literature was disseminated by schools and
monastaries of the Church and when "books were composed and classics
copied not for profit but for the glory of God and the Church, and the
freer the diffusion of religious truth the greater the glory.' 2
It has been no easy matter to detect ". . . those literary cooks, who
* See Contributor's Section, Masthead, p. 718; for biographical data.
1 17 U.S.C. §§ 1, 101 (1950) ; U. S. CONSY., Art. I, § 8, d. 8; BAim, Txm LAW OF" COPYRIGnT
AND LiTERARY PROPERTY 319 (1944). For infringement regardless of intent, also see BALL,
at 323, 329.
2 Whipple, Copyright, 4 ENcYc. Soc. Sci. 401 (1931).
638
TEST OF LITERARY SIMILARITY
skim the cream of others' books."3 Literary plagiarism is a fine art
which reveals an enlightened development of more than 20 centuries.4
It is no mean task to stake off individually owned plots in a universe of
discourse-the common denominator known as communication by which
human beings seek to understand and utilize each other.3 Judge Story
maintained that every author since the Greek scholars necessarily borrows
from his predecessors, since "there are, and can be, few if any, things
which in an abstract sense, are strictly new and original throughout."6
Whether the evidence is for the persuasion of a judge or a jury,7 and
whether the infringement action is at common law or by statute,' it is
important for the effective application of copyright law that a test of
similarity be designed which protects all parties. Because of the above
mentioned difficulties, the courts feel they should require evidence capable
of satisfyig exacting demands before being persuaded of similarity.9
It would therefore be hoped that scientific evidentiary techniques would
be applied in this field of law which exists for the promotion of the
arts and sciences.10 Unfortunately this is not the case.
THE EXISTING STATE OF THE LAW
The traditional test of similarity is "the spontaneous impression
received by the ordinary observer from a comparative viewing of the two
works.... ." A copy is said to be that which the "average reasonable man
would promptly recognize, without any aid, suggestion or critical analysis
of others, as so nearly like the original as to lead him to conclude that
it had been taken from or reproduced from the original." It is not to be
determined by the "fine analysis, argument and dissection of an expert,
but by ordinary observation... the two works should be considered and
3 Hannah More, "Florio" (1786).
4 The word "plagiarism" was first applied to literary piracy in 1 A.D.; See BA=L, op.
cit. supra note 1, at 323; and compare Rudyard Kipling's "Barrack Room Ballads":
"When 'Omer smote 'is bloomin' lyre
He'd 'eard men sing by land an' sea;
An' what he though 'e might require
'e went an' took . . . the same as me".
5 For a meaningful discussion of the breadth of communication's role in today's society,
see Wirth, Consensus and Mass Communication, 13 A.caa. SocioL. Rnv. 1 (1948).
6 Emerson v. Davies, 8 Fed. Cas. 615, 619, No. 4,436 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845). One may
speculate as to whether plaintiff Story felt as philosophical about it two years later when his
"Commentaries" were allegedly infringed. Story v. Holcombe, 23 Fed. Cas. 171, No. 13,497
(C.C.D. Ohio 1847).
7 Note, 38 Ci.w. L. REv. 332, 336 (1950).
8 See 51 L.R.A. 353, 378 (1901).
9 See; e.g., Simonton v. Gordon, 297 Fed. 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1924).
10 Cf. Beutel, ExperimentaZ Jurisprudence, 51 Cot.. L. Rnv. 415 (1951).
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tested, not hypercritically or with meticulous scrutiny, but by the observa-
tions and impressions of the average reader and spectator." In short,
the present test of similarity insists that the "common knowledge of the
average reader, observer, spectator or listener is the standard of judgment
which must be used."'1
This test of the "impression upon the ordinary observer" without any
aid from experts has seemingly become well settled law applicable to
every kind of copyright infringement action: music; 2 motion pictures; 13
plays;' 4 radio programs;' and, of course, all books, poems and other
literary works.'6 It is especially well established, in principle at least,
in the Second and Ninth Federal Circuits which, by virtue of their
coverage of New York City and Hollywood, are the most important
circuits in copyright law.' The roots of the rule may be traced back to
leading copyright cases.'8
This rule of the ordinary observer appears at first blush to be another
phase of the typical legal maxim about the "ordinary reasonable man."'"
However, its more profound effect lies in its condemnation of expert
opinion. Treatment of any type of expert evidence upon the issue of
similarity varies from case to case, but it is consistently negative."
11 BALL, op. cit. supra note 1, at 339, 345; 20th Century Fox v. Stonesifer, 140 F.2d
579, 582 (9th Cir. 1944) ; Fleischer Studios v. Freundlich, 73 F. 2d 276, 278 (2d Cir. 1934) ;
King Features Syndicate v. Fleischer, 299 Fed. 533, 535 (2d Cir. 1924); Contemporary
Arts v. Woolworth Co., 93 F. Supp. 739, 743 (D. Mass. 1950); Seltzer v. Sunbrock, 22 F.
Supp. 621 (S.D. Cal. 1938); Hirsch v. Paramount Pictures, 17 F. Supp. 816, 818 (S.D. Cal.
1937); Echevarria v. Warner Bros., 12 F. Supp. 632 (S.D. Cal. 1935); Wiren v. Shubert
Theater Corp., 5 F. Supp. 358, 362 (S.D.N.Y. 1933); Barbadillo v. Goldwyn, 42 F.2d
881 (S.D. Cal. 1930); Fox, Evidence of Plagiarism in the Law cf Copyright, 6 TORONTO
L.J. 414, 458 (1946); Miller, A Re-examination of Literary Piracy, 5 NzwAx L. REv. 327,
342 (1940); Note, 38 CAT . L. REv. 332 (1950).
12 Arnstein v. Broadcast Music, 46 F. Supp. 379 (S.D.N.Y. 1942); Hein v. Harris,
175 Fed. 875 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1910).
13 Harold Lloyd Corp. v. Witwer, 65 F. 2d 1, 18 (9th Cir. 1933); Solomon v. RKO
Radio Pictures, 44 F. Supp. 780, 782 (S.D. N.Y. 1942) ; Roe-Lawton v. Hal Roach Studios,
18 F. 2d 126, 128 (S.D. Cal. 1927). See note 11 supra.
14 Dymow v. Bolton, 11 F. 2d 690, 692 (2d Cir. 1926) ; Wiren v. Schubert Theatre Corp.,
5 F. Supp. 358 (S.D.N.Y. 1933); BAL, op cit. supra note 1, at 345.
15 Stanley v. C.B.S., 208 P. 2d 9 (1949), aff'd, 35 Cal. 2d 779, 221 P. 2d 73 (1950) ; BALL,
op. cit. supra note 1.
16 BAIL, op. ct. supra note 1, at 321, 324, 339, 345; and Fox, supra note 11, at 458;
see note 11 supra.
17 See notes 11 to 16 supra.
18 Daly v. Palmer, 6 Fed. Cas. 1132, 1138, No. 3,552 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1868); Dymow v.
Bolton, 11 F. 2d 690, 692 (2d Cir. 1926).
19 It has been so analyzed and attributed; see BAIL, op. cit. supra note 1, at 345; and
Sheldon v. Metro Goldwyn Mayer, 7 F. Supp. 837 (S.D.N.Y. 1934).
20 AImDUR, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE 727 (1936).
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Some courts have held that such expert testimony "ought not to be
allowed at all."'" Other courts hold that such evidence is admissible and
perhaps even helpful to bring alleged similarities to the court's attention;
but that such evidence has "no probative force" because it is in reality
"only pleadings" or "secondary evidence"; consequently the trial court
must not accept the opinions, arguments or conclusions of such experts.
22
Other courts emphasize that such testimony is completely unnecessary,
since the court, assuming the role of the ordinary observer, has before
it all necessary data when it has compared the two works on its own.'
It is not clear which chicken or egg first led to the other: the expert
being rejected because the test is simply that of the ordinary observer;
or the test of the ordinary observer being established as the result of a
suspicion and disdain for expertise. Today the two go hand in hand.
Adherence to the test of the ordinary observer is said to spring "from
the fear that by dissection, abstraction and analysis of the works, simi-
larity will be found in the wholly dissimilar."2 Adherence to the rule
against experts is said to be based on the test of the ordinary observer.25
What is the basis for this fear and rejection of the aid of an expert in
finding similarity? A leading precedent relied upon for this point of view
is the oft-quoted dictum of Judge Learned Hand:
We cannot approve the length of the record, which was due chiefly
to the use of expert witnesses.... The testimony of an expert upon such
issues, especially his cross-examination, greatly extends the trial. It ought
not be allowed at all; and while its admission is not a ground for reversal,
it encumbers the case and tends to confusion, for the more the court is
led into the intricacies of dramatic craftsmanship, the less likely it is to
stand upon the firmer, if more naive, ground of its considered impressions
upon its own perusal. We hope that in this class of cases such evidence
may in the future be entirely excluded, and the case confined to the actual
issues .... 26
Again and again the courts repeat their scorn for "dissection" under
21 Nichols v. Universal Pictures, 45 F. 2d 119, 122, 123 (2d Cir. 1930).
22 West Publishing Co. v. Edward Thompson Co., 169 Fed. 833, 854, 858 (C.C.E.D.N.Y.
1909); Encyclopedia Britannica Co. v. American Newspaper Ass'n, 130 Fed. 460
(C.C.D.NJ. 1904), aff'd, Werner Co. v. Encyclopedia Britannica Co., 134 Fed. 831 (3d
Cir. 1905); Lawrence v. Dana, 15 Fed. Cas. 26, No. 8,136 (C.C.D. Mass. 1869); Simonton
v. Gordon, 297 Fed. 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1924); A.rDUR, op. cit. supra note 20, at 1075; BALL,
op. cit. supra note 1, at 598, 599-601; Waim, A.wmmcA CoPYRIGHT LAW 458 (1917).
23 Christianson v. West Publishing Co., 149 F. 2d 202 (9th Cir. 1945); Kustoff v.
Chaplin, 120 F.2d 551, 559, 561 (9th Cir. 1941); Falk v. Donaldson, 57 Fed. 32
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1893); BALL, op. cit. supra note 1, at 598.
24 Note, 38 CA. iF. L. REv. 332, 333 (1950).
25 See note 23 supra.
26 Nichols v. Universal Pictures, 45 F. 2d 119, 122, 123 (2d Cir. 1930).
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the microscopic eye and cold, fine analysis and argument of the expert,
which they are certain would reflect technical ingenuity rather than
reality.27 The court is fearful of being led into the intricacies of literary
technique by experts who reduce incidents to abstractions or sublimations
in order to find identity, and consequently prevent the judge from
placing himself in the attitude of the ordinary observer.s The courts
feel that copyrighted works (as well as the copyright law) are written
for impression "upon the great multitude of plain people" and not for
the few critics and experts skilled in the arts.' Thus if there is any
literary piracy, the "ordinary person ... should detect that fact without
any aid or suggestion or critical analysis. The reaction of .the public
to the matter should be spontaneous and immediate.""0 Since the issue
of infringement or noninfringement is thus treated on a clear and super-
ficial basis, expert testimony, which could only confuse the mechanics of
this standard of judgment, is rejected.3' Serious efforts at comparative
analysis are criticized as inapplicable and naive. 2 The courts have
instead established personal impression as the ultimate, and best, test
of literary similarity33
27 Cain v. Universal Pictures Co., 47 F. Supp. 1013, 1015-1016 (S.D. Cal. 1942) ; Christie
v. Harris, 47 F. Supp. 39, 41 (S.D.N.Y. 1942); Carew v. RKO Radio Pictures, 43 F. Supp.
199 (S.D. Cal. 1942); Eisman v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 23 F. Supp. 519 (S.D.N.Y. 1938);
Frankel v. Irwin, 34 F. 2d 142, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1918); Fox, supra note 11, at 457-58;
Miller, A Re-examination of Literary Piracy, 5 NEwAm L. REv. 327 (1940).
28 See footnote 27 supra; see BA=-,, op. cit. supra note 1, at 599, and Fox, supra note 11,
at 457, and cases cited therein.
29 Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F. 2d 464, 468, 471 (2d Cir. 1946); 20th Century Fox v.
Stonesifer, 140 F. 2d 579, 582 (9th Cir. 1944); Kustoff v. Chaplin, 120 F. 2d 551, 559-561
(9th Cir. 1941) ; Dymow v. Bolton, 11 F. 2d 690, 692 (2d Cir. 1926) ; Armstein v. Broad-
cast Music, 46 F. Supp. 379 (S.D.N.Y. 1942); and WEln, op. cit. supra note 22, at 458.
But compare BALL, op. cit. supra note 1, at 344, with Arnold Bennett's well known
observation:
"The large majority of our fellow-citizens care as much about literature as they
care about aeroplanes or the program of the Legislature. They do not ignore it; they
are not quite indifferent to it. But their interest in it is faint and perfunctory; or, if
their interest happens to be violent, it is spasmodic. .. . A classic is a work which
gives pleasure to the minority which is intensely and permanently interested in
literature."
BENN-r, LITERARY TASTE, HOW TO FoRm IT (1909) in a chapter called "Why a Classic
is a Classic."
30 Harold Lloyd Corp. v. Witwer, 65 F. 2d 1 (9th Cir. 1933).
31 Burns v. 20th Century Fox Film Corp. 75 F. Supp. 986, 992 (D. Mass. 1948); ("Miracle
on 34th Street" held to be no infringement of Ralph Burns' novel "Angel on Horseback");
cf. note 23 supra.
32 See generally footnotes 11 to 32 supra; and see BArL, op. cit. supra note 1, at 346.
33 See note 50 infra.
TEST OF LITERARY SIMILARITY
FAULTS AND FALLACIES OF THE TRADITIONAL TEST
Certainly much of the blame for the rejection of expert evidence for
personal impression on the issue of similarity must be placed on the
unhappy experiences courts have had with such evidence in the past.
In many cases, ,the court has been absolutely correct in analyzing the
parallel columns and elaborate diagrams submitted by experts as "illus-
trative of the classic difficulty of not being able to see the forest for the
trees ... not only unpersuasive but in many parts silly... inconsequential
similarities . . .fantastic hypotheses . . . the height of absurdity . *
solemn nonsense... adjectives so general as to be quite useless .... ,34
The judicial standing of the traditional test, with its disdain of "ex-
pertise," is not completely secure. The United States Supreme Court
has never approved the test for its own use." Moreover, many of the
early cases relied upon as precedent were patent infringement cases;
here the test of the ordinary observer is used on patent designs because
the essence of the protection lies less in the claim to authorship and
originality (as in copyright protection) as it does in prohibiting a
resemblance sufficient to deceive purchasers of a particular article (a
finished product) . Such a rationale is not applicable to a large majority
of copyright cases; no purchaser was deceived into believing that X's
film was Y's book; or even that he was seeing Z film when he actually
intended to purchase tickets to Y film.
Moreover, the standard procedure in the early common law cases
was to refer both works to a master for expert examination and compari-
son. The case of Lawrence v. Dana,37 often relied upon as a precedent
for the rejection of expert testimony, insisted that a comparison by the
judges alone, without the master's report, was a procedure impractical
in its operation and dangerous in its potential injustice to the authors.
Early English and Canadian Courts also followed this procedure: "It
would be absurd for the Chief Justice to sit and hear both books read
over.... This I think is one of those cases where it would be much better
for the parties to fix upon two persons of learning . . who would ac-
34 Frankel v. Irwin, 34 F. 2d 142, 144 (SD.N.Y. 1918); Nichols v. Universal Pictures,
45 F. 2d 119, 122, 123 (2d Cir. 1930); Bachman v. Belasco, 224 Fed. 817 (2d Cir. 1915);
Lewys v. O'Neill, 49 F. 2d 603, 611 (S.D.N.Y. 1931); and Fox, supra note 11, at 449.
35 Cf. White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
36 Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. 511 (1842); Ripley v. Elson Glass Co., 49 Fed. 927,
930 (C.C.ED. Ohio 1892); cf. Boosey v. Whight, 1 Ch. 122 (1900).
37 15 Fed. Cas. 26, No. 8, 136 (C.C.D. Mass. 1869); See also Greene v. Bishop, 10 Fed.
Cas. 1128, No. 5,763 (C.C.D. Mass. 1858).
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curately and carefully compare them, and report their opinion to the
court."3
Moreover, the test is very often ignored by the courts, and has been
specifically criticized or rejected by judges and legal writers cited
herein. Nathan Burkan, a well known copyright lawyer, was at one time
successful in persuading a rejection of the ordinary observer test which
had been strongly urged upon the Judge by opposing counsel. Burkan
convinced the judge that he must "have a more Olympian viewpoint than
the average play-goer."39 Even the Second Circuit has criticized the
test as "impractical, ignored, artificial and disappointingly inaccurate
in its application, and acknowledged as inconclusive. 40  In a recent
musical copyright case, speaking through Judge Frank, the Second Circuit
distinguished the issue of copying, where expert analysis and even
"dissection" were now supposedly invited, from the issue of illicit copying,
where the ordinary observer test remains.41 In concurring, Judge Clark
attacked the distinction, and concluded that copying is one "issue to be
decided with all the intelligence, musical as well as legal, we can bring
to bear upon it."' Thus expert testimonials are actually often heard
and relied upon in Second Circuit copyright cases.43
Similarly, West Coast courts have relied upon expert testimony to
show value lost, damages, orginality and other issues closely related to
similarity.44
The same authors on copyright law who uphold the traditional test
also realize its fallacious and artificial basis, and its false oversimplifica-
tion of the problem:
38 Giles v. Wilcox, 2 Atk. 141, 144 (Ch. 1740); See also Jeffrey v. Bowles, [1770]
Dick. 429; Jeffrey v. Leadbetter, 4 Ves. 681 (1799).
39 Sheldon v. Metro Goldwyn Mayer, 7 F. Supp. 837 (S.D.N.Y. 1934).
40 Shipman v. RKO Radio Pictures, 100 F. 2d 533 (2d Cir. 1938); cf. the concurring
opinion by Judge L. Hand saying the test is "necessarily vague"; id. at 538; and cf. Dellar v.
Goldwyn, 104 F. 2d 661 (2d Cir. 1939), saying that the above case meant no change in
the rule.
41 Heim v. -Universal Pictures Co., 154 F. 2d 480, 488 (2d Cir. 1946).
42 Id. at 488, 491.
43 It might be pointed out that this is especially true in music cases; see Willde v.
Santly Bros., 91 F. 2d 978, 979 (2d Cir. 1937) ; Marks v. Leo Feist, 290 Fed. 595 (2d Cir.
1923); Arnstein v. A.S.C.A.P., 29 F. Supp. 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1939). And see also a much
earlier Second Circuit case where expert evidence of parallel columns was highly valued
by the court; West Publishing Co v. Lawyers Cooperative Publishing Co., 79 Fed. 756
(2d Cir. 1897).
44 Universal Pictures Co. v. Harold Lloyd Corp., 162 F. 2d 354, 361, 370 (9th Cir. 1947);
Stanley v. C.B.S., 208 P. 2d 9 (1949), aff'd, 35 Cal. 2d 779, 221 P.2d 73, 91 (1950) (both
majority and dissenting opinions criticized the oversimplification of the ordinary observer
test); Golding v. RKO Pictures, 193 P. 2d 153 (1948), aff'd, 208 P. 2d 1 (1949), aff'd, 35
Cal. 2d 690, 221 P. 2d 95 (1950).
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If it were strictly applied, substantial injuries would often result and
many willful plagiarists escape the penalty of their acts. The arts are too
complex to be reduced to such a simplified formula. More often than not,
it requires a searching analysis based upon the testimony of expert witnesses
before a charge of infringement can be either established or dismissed.45
To distinguish the ideas, plots, title, phraseology, characters and locale,
all of which are not infringible, from the "original form of expression,
language or thought sequence and literary style" is simply too difficult
a job for the ordinary observer making a superficial comparison." The
fact that the two works produce the same emotions upon the observer
is not enough,47 and, besides, is impossible of verification. It is too much
to expect the average individual to have sufficient understanding of the
particular subject-matter involved48 or to view it with a perspective
common to all in order that all "ordinary observers" would report the
same thing (which is surely the first requirement of reliability of any
descriptive technique).
It has been said that many judges, in attempting to apply the test,
have become lost "in a metaphysical discussion of the similarities or
lack of similarities . ..and lose sight of the real problem. '49 Yet the
courts now seem to consider themselves the best arbiters of originality
and plagiarism, and base their conclusions on their own literary, dramatic,
musical or artistic perceptions and preconceptions ° There surely is no
logical justification for such a standard. Judges and authors agree that
the former's qualifications as judges do not give them the necessary
background for such a task.0 ' Meanwhile, copyright counsel have no
way of knowing whether the judge read all of the works, scanned part of
45 Fox, supra note 11 at 417; see also BALL, op. cit. supra note 1, at 347.
46 BALL, op. cit. supra note 1, at 321, 342, 347; AvMUn, op. cit. supra note 20, at 696.
47 BALL, op. cit. supra note 1, at 344; AiwuR, op. cit. supra note 20, at 712.
48 See note 23, supra.
49 Driscoll, Copyright Infringement, 11 FoRD. L. Rav. 63 (1942).
G0 Solomon v. RKO Radio Pictures, 44 F. Supp. 780, 782 (S.D.N.Y. 1942); Arnstein
v. Marks Music Corp., 11 F. Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1935); Lowenfels v. Nathan, 2 F. Supp.
73 (S.D.N.Y. 1932); Underhill v. Belasco, 254 Fed. 838 (S.D.N.Y. 1918); "While I do
not pretend to any dramatic knowledge . . ."; Fox, supra note 11, at 451, 457; and see
generally notes 11 to 32 supra. "Judge Yankwich, in a recent paper, admits that the
determination of similarity or originality is difficult, and that the traditional test, which
he supports, requires an understanding of the medium with which the judge is dealing
and a 'proper and intelligent' application of the test. But he strongly prefers it to expert
evidence: 'Fortunately, American judges trained in the pragmatic system of the common
law have . . .kept their feet solidly on the ground, much to the dismay of disgruntled
authors . . .who . . . would substitute unreal for the pragmatic tests of originality.'"
Yankwich, Originality in the Law of Intellectual Property, 11 F.R.D. 457, 468, 471 (1951).
-5 Hein v. Harris, 175 Fed. 875 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1910); (Judge L. Hand says that he is
glad a local judge, who is also a musician, agrees); Miller, supra note 27, at 327.
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each, used his own sampling system, or how much weight, if any, he will
give to the exhibits submitted.52
In short, the traditionally popular rule of similarity is neither an
established legal tradition nor unanimously popular.. Its inherent weak-
nesses and abuses have been set forth frequently; and its employment
by most courts is an abandonment of serious effort to protect the rights
of all. The only reason for retaining such a practice in the copyright
courts is the lack of a better alternative and a fear of the results if the
gates are opened to expert evidence. But mere criticism or dissatisfac-
tion with the present test without specific proposals of alternatives makes
no contribution toward alleviation of this dilemma and only further
entrenches the traditional position.53
CONTENT ANALYSIS: A PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE TO THE
TRADITIoNAL TEST
Is it possible for expert effort to be utilized in a more scientific de-
termination of similarity? If expert help, whether sought by court or
by counsel, is to consist of "fantastic hypotheses" and "solemn nonsense,"
then there is no need for abandoning the existing rules. If, on the other
hand, sound techniques of analysis could be employed by qualified ex-
perts, the law of copyright can progress to more adequate standards,
and victory or defeat in an infringement action will be less a matter of
chance.
The social sciences have developed evidentiary techniques used by
literary historians54 to a point where they have already been accepted
in several phases of law. These techniques today are commonly grouped
under the label of a specialized science, "content analysis."
Content anal~rsis is a precise research technique for the objective,
systematic, and quantitative as well as qualitative description of the
contents of any sort of communication: newspaper stories,5 5 editorials,5 6
52 See Fox, supra note 11, at 491, 457.
53 See, e.g., Nhnmer, Inroads on Copyright Protection, 64 HARv. L. Rxv. 1125 (1952),
wherein the author questions the legal basis of the traditional test, fears its effect upon
honest artists and authors, but opposes the exclusive use of any 'scientific' test, of which
he has none to suggest, though scornfully mentioning the algebraic formulae of ML-
vINSxY, THE ScIecE OF PLAYWRETING (1925).
54 BERELSON & LAZARSELD, T]cE ANALYsIs OF COam£UNIcATIoN CONTENT 15, 48, 49
(Preliminary draft 1948).
-55 THoa soN, QUANTITATIVE ANALYsIs or NEWSPAPER OPINION PRIOR TO THE SPANISHE-
AmpccAN WaR (unpublished master's thesis, U. of Chicago 1946); Larms, TrE TmRn
INTERNATIONAL ON ITS CANGES or PoLicy: A STuoY OF PoLITIcAL ComucATioN
(Library of Congress, Experimental Division for Study of War Time Communications,
Document No. 25, 1942); Lasswell, The Politically Significant Content of the Press:
[Vol. 3 7
TEST OF LITERARY SIMILARITY
short stories and novels,"1 radio and television broadcasts," moving
pictures, 9 newsreels, 0 public speeches and sermons,' textbooks, 62 ad-
vertising,' and even those non-verbal forms of communication not
considered here but which are often involved in copyright cases-music,
art and maps.6" The technique is to dissect the mass of content, the
whole of which might be beyond the careful perusal of any judge or jury,
through rules of analysis that establish categories making possible ob-
jective selection and classification of the significant material. The use
of content analysis thus enables the investigator, among other things,
to determine relationships between a given communication and some
other content and in more precise terms than is provided by impressionis-
tic "more or less" judgments.6 5
Conclusions reached by the methods of content analysis have been
admitted in evidence by federal courts, relied upon by the Department
of Justice, and successfully applied by and before the Federal Com-
munications Commission.66 These uses have been chiefly in connection
Coding Procedures, 19 JouRN.Ism Q. 12 (1942); Lasswell, The World Attention Survey,
5 PuB. Op. Q. 456 (1941); Wilson, Newspaper Opinion and Crime in Boston, 29 J. CRM.
L. & CREMINoLoGY 202 (1938).
56 Ames, Editorial Treatment of Lynchings, 2 PuB. Op. Q. 77 (1938); Geller, Kaplan,
and Lasswell, An Experimental Comparison of Four Ways of Coding "Editorial Content,
19 JouRNArIsm Q. 362 (1942); Russell and Wright, National Attitudes in the Far Eastern
Controversy, 27 AM. PoL. Scr. REv. 555 (1933); Twohey, An Analysis of Newspaper
Opinion on War Issues, 5 PUB. Op. Q. 448 (1941).
57 McKenzie, Treatment of War Themes in Magazine Fiction, 5 PUB. Op. Q. 227 (1941).
58 Lasswell, Describing the Contents of Communications, in SMITH, LASsWE, AND CAsEY,
PROPAGANDA, COMMIUIICATION, AND PUBLIC OPINION (1946).
59 Jones, Quantitative Analysis of Motion Picture Content, 6 PUB. Op. Q. 411 (1942).
60 Dale, Need for Study of the Newsreels, 1 PUB. Op. Q. 122 (1938).
61 Hamilton, Social Optimism and Pessimism in American Protestantism, 6 PUB. Op. Q.
280 (1942); McDiarmid, Presidential Inaugural Addresses: A Study in Verbal Symbols,
1 PUS. Op. Q. 79 (1937).
62 Saunders, Social Ideas in the McGuffey Readers, 5 PUB. Op. Q. 579 (1941).
63 Severson, Nationality and Religious Preferences as Reflected in Newspaper Advertise-
ments, 44 AMER. J. SocIoL. 540 (1939); Shuman, Identification Elements of Advertising
Slogans, 17 S.W. Soc. Sm. Q. 342 (1937).
64 BERELSON & LAZARSnELD, op. cit. supra. note 54.
65 Note Content Analysis: A New Evidentiary Technique, 15 U. or CH'. L. Rav. 910,
912, 914, 915 (1948); SITH, LASSwELL, & CASEY, PROPAGANDA, COMMUNICATION AND
PUBLIC OPioNo (1946); Janis, The Problem of Validating Content Analysis, and Kaplan
and Goldsen, The Reliability of Content Analysis Categories, in LAssw=:, LEITrs et at.,
LANGUAGE OF POLITICS, 55 et seq., 83 (1949).
66 See Note, 15 U. ox Cm. L. Rv. 910 (1948); Lasswell, Detection: Propaganda Detec-
tion and the Courts in LAsswEri et al., op. cit. supra note 65, at 173; U.S. v. Pelley, 132
F. 2d 170 (7th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 764; and see U.S. v. Aubagen, 39 F. Supp.
590 (D.D.C. 1941); see In re W.H.K.C., 10 F.C.C. 515 (1945); see United States v.
German-American Vocational League, 153 F. 2d 860 (3d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 328 U.S.
833 (1946); United States v. Transocean, Docket No. 67418 (D.C. 1941).
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with the detection of enemy propaganda and sedition, in investigating
charges of bias, and in comparing radio broadcasting content with ad-
ministrative standards. Its successful use in these fields suggests the
possibility of utilizing the technique elsewhere in the law, bringing to
courts "facts heretofore beyond their ken."" The courts have already
recognized such evidence to be competent expert testimony which satisfies
the guarantee of trustworthiness for criminal action; and not within
the hearsay rule since it goes to proving the fact of utterance, not the
truth of the utterance.
68
The field of copyright law and proof of similarity would seem especially
adaptable to modern scientific methods of content analysis. The latter's
use of the "parallel test" in analyzing similar themes and differences,
repeated or copied errors, sources, distinctive vocabularies and emphasis
in presentationO should be useful in providing courts and counsel with
more adequate methods of detection in difficult infringement actions.
If the courts wish to cling to the shell of the "ordinary observer" test,
copyright counsel in the future can introduce scientific evidence as to
what the actual impressions on ordinary observers are through reliable
methods of content analysis (in fact defined as describing "the influence
upon typical readers")," rather than through the impressions of judge
or jury assuming to speak for all "ordinary observers."
A complete description and appraisal of the scientific development of
content analysis is outside the scope of this paper. The succeeding
paragraphs, however, will discuss some of the problems to be anticipated
in utilizing this technique in the courts.
The use of content analysis techniques in literary infringement cases
would be strictly limited to problems of proof regarding content similarity.
No verifiable conclusions can be drawn regarding the intent of the writer
by an analysis of what he has written.1 Content analysis, even should
67 See note, 15 U. op Cm. L. Rxv. 910, 918, 924, 925 (1948); and Reisman, Democracy
and Defamation, 42 COL. L. REV. 1282, 1307 (1942).
68 See U.S. v. Pelley, supra note 66 at 176, 178, 180; and Brief for the U.S., 49-51;
see ST. GEORGE & Dmnm, A TRiAL Ox TRIA. (1946), a book written by two of the leading
defense counsel in the mass sedition trial where they attack content analysis as "learned
hokum" (p. 302).
9 Lasswell, op. cit. supra note 65, at 180.
70 WAPLES, BERELSON AND BRADSuAW, WET READING DOES TO PEOPLE 146 (1940); see
also Note, 15 U. OF Cm. L. REv. 910, 922 (1948).
71 "As to the publisher's state of mind no demonstration has been made of which of
the aspects of the crime story, jointly or severally, influenced the city editor in deciding
to run the story: The Jewish "Angle," the sensational details, or the opportunity to spread
many pictures of the murdered beauty on the front page." Note, 15 U. or Cm. L. REV.
910, 919 (1948), regarding efforts of the American Jewish Congress to prove an anti-
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it reveal a word for word similarity between two documents, is not
designed to prove or disprove that the author of one document intended
to copy the words of another. Content analysis does, however, make it
possible to isolate, classify, and inventory quantitatively the words and
themes-thus presenting a statistical opportunity to figure the proba-
bilities that such similarity did not occur by chance.
Nor can content analysis techniques be utilized to demonstrate in-
fringement because similar reader reactions are found to take place
with respect to compared content. Who can prove the causal relationship
between allegedly similar content and similar emotional reactions re-
gardless of their correlation? To assert that infringement is proved
because identical emotions do or may be predicted to occur in response
to the contents of two documents under observation is to foreclose con-
sideration of the nature of the receiving mechanisms (the psychological
makeup of those to whom the materials are communicated) and the
social and political climate in which the materials are received. While
studies of this sort are extremely important to the field of communica-
tions,72 they deserve no consideration by the courts because of their
complexity and the huge amount of guess work still associated with the
results.7
The two major types of content analysis which concern us have been
referred to as (1) "sign-vehicle" analysis and (2) "semantical con-
tent" analysis.74 The simpler of the two is the sign-vehicle analysis type.
Its function would be to count the number of instances in which given,
verbal symbols or combinations of verbal symbols (words, phrases and
sentences) appear. Providing that the analyst is personally dependable,
fully understands the rules of analysis and what he is looking for, and
is possessed of adequate qualities of perception, a first hand census of
the frequency of physical occurrences is all that is involved. For many
years, parallel charts attempting this type of analysis have been offered
in copyright cases, generally to be rejected.
semitic approach of a newspaper's news columns. WBNX Broadcasting Co. et al, Docket
No. 6013 and In re Application of News Syndicate Co., Docket No. 6175, before the Federal
Communications Commission.
72 See Smith, The Political Communication Specialist of Our Times, and Lasswell, Describ-
ing the Effects of Communications in S~arr, LASSWFLL, & CAsny, op. cit. supra note 65.
73 The failure to achieve validity with content analysis techniques which classify language
according to their probable causes and effects is discussed in Janis, Meaning and the Study
of Symbolic Behavior, 6 PsYc~amRY 425 (1943) and Janis, Fadner, and Janowitz, The
Reliability of a Content Analysis Technique, 7 PUB. Or. Q. 293 (1943).
74 These two classifications along with "Pragmatical content" analysis are discussed in
Janis, supra note 65, at 57.
1952]
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
The technique of validating this content analysis type would be simple
in nature. Verification would demand only the independent comparison
between analyst's tabulations and frequency of occurrence of the items
he was counting. Provision for an independent check of the analyst's
work could be made in this manner: assume that a check was made on
the analyst's tally of the number of times that the word "psychiatrist"
appeared in a twelve-page short story. The analyst should divide the
work under analysis into twelve or possibly twenty-four sections of equal
length. His own work sheet should be divided correspondingly. Thus
an independent checker would observe the results in terms of specific
section and randomly spot check three or four sections in their entirety to
ascertain the analyst's accuracy. If there is any deviation between the
two, analyst and checker would re-examine their tallies because no
deviation should exist. If a discrepancy still remains, the matter should
be submitted to three referees who would remove the issue from dispute
either by discovering an error on the part of one or both of the previously
mentioned parties, or by clarifying the rules of analysis and investigating
the orientation of analyst and checker to similar rules which should not
be dissimilarly applied. This form of validation can of course be applied
to any analysis technique.
It is questionable, however, that sign-vehicle analysis will offer very
much utility because (a) it is not the number of times a given word or
phrase may appear but the fact and circumstances of its appearance
which would be important; (b) unless a literary work were a straight
copy of another, the similar words or phrases seldom appear, a point
which indicates the need for utilizing "semantical content" analysis
techniques.
It is obvious that the fact that the word "lazy" appears ten times in
short story X and ten times in short story Y (published ten years later)
suggests no test of legal similarity between the two. If, on the other hand,
each of the two documents had five personalities figuring in its plot, if all
five characters of document X were respectively described by the identical
words in 84 percent of the instances of description in document Y, and
if eight of document Y's eleven plot situations were described equally
similarly to those of document X, a conclusion would be in order as to
whether or not the pattern of similarity was due to chance.
However, it is unlikely that there will be any one-to-one correlation
between the chronological order of appearance of similar individuals and
plot situations even though the identical words may be used. Therefore,
the sign-vehicle analyst will be required to break down the content he is
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studying into elements less basic than atomistic for the purpose of inter-
preting his analysis of verbal symbols. Thus, in analyzing the contents
of documents X and Y, he would do a sign vehicular analysis of each
personality introduced, each plot situation described, and each one of
the props (physical environment) described. Treating both short stories
in this manner, the analyst would then be able to square character
against character, plot situation against plot situation, etc., in an effort
to determine whether one or more units from the one document bears
similarity (and to what degree) to one or more of the other.
Of even greater importance for the application of content analysis
techniques to the issue of similarity in literary copyright cases are the
semantical content analysis techniques. These procedures which would
classify language symbols in terms of their meanings as well as their
physical occurrence are generally considered to be of three fundamental
types: (a) designations analysis, which enumerates the frequency
with which certain objects, including persons, things, groups or concepts,
are referred to (e.g., references to psychiatry); (b) attribution analysis,
which enumerates the frequency with which certain descriptions or
characterizations are referred to (e.g., Freudian); (c) assertions analysis,
which enumerates the frequency with which certain objects are described
or characterized in a particular way-the manner in which (a) and (b)
are combined (e.g., Psychiatry's origins are Freudian in nature).
Since meaning rather than only the physical record of the word is
involved, two methodological problems deserve careful thought:
(1) A given portion of content could be ambiguous in its meaning
for several individuals, each thinking it means something else. Assertions
which are of confirmed ambiguity can, of course, be omitted, or if their
omission would appear to be significant, a numerical weight can be
assigned to such figures.75
These same problems have already been encountered in the use of
personal 'documents in the social sciences."' An initial fundamental
objection to conclusions emerging from studies of communications of a
personal nature, i.e., diaries, letters, autobiographies, etc., was that judges,
no matter what their expert qualifications, could not agree upon what
75 For a technical discussion of this point, see Kaplan and Goldsen, The Reliability of
Content Analysis Categories (chapter V) in LASSWELL, LErrES et at., LANGUAGE OF PoIrrcs
(1949).
76 For a full discussion of the problems of reliability and validity in connection with
the analysis of personal documents, see A .PoRT, THE USE or PERSONAL DocUNNTS n
PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE (1942); GorscmAx, KsucK3O:HN, & ANGELL, THE USE op
PERSONAL Docu=aNTs nr HISTORY, ANTHROPOLOGY AND SOCIOLOGY (1945).
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these documents actually said. Testimonials regarding the nature of
personal document content, it was argued, would offer no meaningful
conclusions regarding the content of the document.
Published studies have since considerably disspelled this challenge. In
one study the conclusions of independently rated autobiographies were
compared with the recorded outcome of clinical interviews for the degree
of agreement with reference to the subjects' emotional stability. The
degree of correlation obtained in all instances was .80 or above.7 Allport
summarizes the results of another study as follows:
Four judges rated 238 topical autobiographies on a graphic rating scale
in respect to the autobiographer's attitude toward prohibition. By averag-
ing the intercorrelations of the composite ratings, expressed as standard
scores, of each pair of judges with each other pair, a reliability coefficient of
±.96 was obtained. Correlating the composite ratings given by readers of
the case history with the earlier measured attitude toward prohibition of
the subject ... a validity coefficient of +.81 resulted (±.86 if corrected for
attenuation). The conclusion of this straightforward investigation is thatjudges are able to agree in their rating of self-written documents and,
furthermore, to agree with an independent source of information con-
cerning the attitudes of the writers of these documents.79
This problem of reliability, as it affects the analysis of many kinds of
communication content, has been carefully worked out and published by
content analysis experts and is tested by determining the degree of corre-
lation between the results obtained when different analysts independently
analyze the same content. 0
(2) Another major aspect has to do with the relationship between
one portion of the contents under observation and the contents as a whole.
Content analysis must demand more than a theme-by-theme analysis of
content so that the relationship between each part or the whole and its.
parts does not escape measurement. "By the nature and meaning of a
statement is not meant its grammar or inner logic."'" To what extent,
for example, may given statements or themes of one document compare
similarly to those of another document, yet function entirely differently
in the document as a whole. A given idea or situation or personality
characteristic may be exploited in any number of several ways by writers;
surely none need have the same destiny or source. The expert analyst,
77 STAGNER, THE PSYCHOLOGY oF PERsoxALIr (1937).
78 STOUFFER, Asw EXPESiENTAL Com'PARIso OF STATISTICAL AND CASE HISTORYe MxIIODS
or ATITUDE RESEARCH (Unpublished dissertation, U. of Chicago 1930).
79 Allport, op. cit. supra: note 76 at 24. See also Cavan, Hauser, and Stouffer, Note on
the Statistical Treatment of Life History Material, 9 Soc. FORCES 200 (1930).
80 Janis, supra note 65, at 56 and note 84 infra.
81 Garher, Propaganda Analysis-To What Ends?, 48 ANMR. J. SOCIOL. 240 (1942).
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then, will recognize the need for full acquaintance with the document
as a whole and will appreciate its contribution to the meaning of the
content being analyzed.
Major variable factors which, unlike the present system of similarity
comparison, can be controlled or accounted for under content analysis,
are summarized by Berelson and Lazarsfeld as follows:
a) Formulation of definitions and rules: the more precise and complete
the rules of analysis and the definitions of categories (and the fuller
their illustration), the higher the reliability.
b) Units of analysis: the larger the units, the higher the reliability for
subject matter categories (and perhaps for other categories as well).
c) Training and experience of the coders: the more general experience
in content analysis and the more specific training on the particular
project the coders have had, the higher reliability is likely to be.0 2
d) Complexity of the category: the more elaborate and complex the
category system, involving many facets of the content, the lower the
reliability is likely to be.s3
As was previously mentioned, it is not the purpose of this paper to
examine the qualitative and statistical tests of the reliability of content
analysis techniques. The reader may check the several studies to decide
for himself.8 4 Suffice to say, there are many published studies whose
results have been tested for reliability and found satisfactory, although
universal generalizations of reliability have yet to emerge. Unfortunately
some studies indicate that no effort was made to determine the reliability
of their results. Unpublished studies as well as those which may have
been contemplated but abandoned for reasons of want of reliability
cannot be cited.
Content analysis, comparatively toddling in scientific infancy, deserves
cautious employment. The potential expense of the expert testimony
required suggests the danger that wealthy litigants could utilize it while
impoverished litigants could not. Its novelty in the courtroom implies
that some judges will encourage its use by the parties and some will not.
It would seem advisable for the parties to agree in advance, in much
the same way as was suggested over 200 years ago, on the use of experts
82 See Meier and Lervinski, Occupational Variation in Judging Trends in Public Opinion,
2 PuB. Op. Q. 422 (1938).
83 BERESON & LAzA s yIn, op. cit. supra note 54, at 136.
84 See id. at 130-134 for a summary of the reliability tests and results appearing in the
published reports of 18 content analysis projects. See also chapters 5-9 in LASSWELL, Lxnxs
et al., op. cit. supra note 69; and BERLsON, CONTENT AwALYsis T Co Mis cAnox RE-
SEMCH (1951).
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in content analysis. 5 Standards of analysis could also be stipulated since
logical reasoning rather than subjective judgment could be utilized.
CONCLUSION
It is submitted that techniques of content analysis provide both neces-
sary and reliable aids to proof of similarity in copyright infringement
cases. The present ordinary observer rule which excludes such expert
evidence is open to error, dangerous and illogical in its use, and lacking
in firm legal foundation. We no longer live in an age in which legalistic
rules of this nature must be tenaciously preserved at the expense of
scientific advancement. Adequate protection of our arts and sciences
would seem to require an amending of the existing rules in order to
consider more fully the contributions of experts skilled at techniques
of content analysis.
85 See note 67 supra.
